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his paper seeks to draw attention to a neglected but essential element of 
institutions: their boundaries.1 Boundaries permit actors to organize the world 
around them into categories and groups and to establish arenas of authority or 
jurisdiction. Scholars too often assume that boundaries between groups are firm and 
clear, and assume that these distinctions form the basis for social hierarchies and 
divisions of labor.2
Our interest in institutional boundaries arose from puzzles arising out of our re-
search. One of us has focused on political parties, and found that despite similar 
structural conditions, actors responded by creating very different boundaries 
between political parties and labor unions. The other one of us focuses on interna-
tional institutional change, and realized that IR theorists’ ability to understand and 
explain such change largely centers on how they conceptualize the boundaries of key 
institutions, in particular those of the sovereign state. What we present here is our 
first effort at laying out the rationale for an investigation of institutional boundaries. 
We view this paper as the initial step in developing a research program that ex-
amines how and why boundaries matter as well as how they arise and change. We 
 However, the nature of boundaries is no less important to institu-
tional operation and social organization than is the fact of their existence. As the first 
step in a larger research program, we set out to elaborate here not only the impor-
tance that the existence of boundaries has in creating and regulating social organiza-
tion, but also the political significance that the varying nature of boundaries has. We 
draw on our own work from very different sub-disciplines of political science to 
highlight what boundaries do and how they vary, as well as to raise a set of theoreti-
cal questions to guide further investigation. 
                                                                
1 The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not represent the official 
position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. 
2 Explanations of nationalism such as those of Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966); Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1983); Ernst Haas, Nationalism, Liberalism and Progress (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1997); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983) are obvious exceptions 
to this. 
T 
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conclude by asking whether the nature of boundaries substantially affects the 
mechanisms of institutional change that are likely to operate. 
We believe that a study of boundaries can aid institutional analysis in a number 
of ways. First, institutional analyses have emphasized how institutions create 
relations of authority; we hope to demonstrate that the bounds of authority, or 
jurisdiction, are as important to understanding political outcomes. Second, like 
relations of authority, boundaries or jurisdictions reflect the circumstances in which 
they are created. As a consequence, boundaries will vary in politically significant 
ways. We believe that a critical dimension on which boundaries vary is in their 
permeability. Finally, we propose as subject for further research that this variance is 
most likely related to particular types of institutional change. 
We proceed first to discuss how the literature on institutions has neglected the 
question of boundaries. We suggest that this neglect has shaped current institutional-
ist accounts of institutional reproduction and change, institutional stability or 
durability, as well as institutional capacity to shape actors’ behavior. We develop in 
greater depth how our proposed attention to boundaries can yield a better under-
standing of institutional reproduction and institutional capacity, as well as institu-
tional change. 
1. THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISMS AND INSTITUTIONAL BORDERS 
The new institutionalisms have focused on the authority relations that institu-
tions create rather than their boundaries. Consider, for example, two well-known 
definitions of institutions from international relations and comparative political 
economy. Stephen Krasner defines institutions, or—more accurately—“international 
regimes,” as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of interna-
tional relations.”3 Peter Hall refers to them as “the formal rules, compliance proce-
dures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between 
individuals in various units of the polity and economy.”4 Both authors emphasize the 
authoritative and hierarchical aspects of institutions rather than the limits of institu-
tions’ authority, or jurisdiction. For Krasner, regimes are bounded by a group of 
actors’ expectations and an issue area. Hall leaves institutional boundaries even less 
well-defined, as “various units.” This neglect of the limits that boundaries place on 
the authority relations inside institutions represents a significant gap in these 
literatures and in our understanding of institutions. Institutions are embedded in 
“societies”5
                                                                
3 Steven Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variable,” in 
International Regimes, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2. 
 with other institutions and, because actors navigate not only within 
4 Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 19. 
5 Note that “society” and “social” refer to particular groupings of actors. “Society” can refer to the 
community of individuals bounded by a state or it can refer to the anarchical “society” of nation 
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institutions but also between them, it is important to understand not only how the 
“rules of the game” work, but also how far they extend.6
2. INSTITUTION BOUNDARIES AND INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS 
 By recognizing that institu-
tions create not only authority relations but also “jurisdictions” we can increase our 
understanding of how institutions come into being, how they reproduce themselves, 
and how they shape the behavior of actors. 
The recognition that institutions not only create authority relations but also 
bound those relations entails the recognition that institutions are a product of forces 
in tension. Institutions are simultaneously the product of cooperation and conflict, an 
outcome that traditional perspectives do not permit. Traditional approaches to group 
formation have tended to emphasize the role of either cooperation or conflict, but not 
their union. For example, pluralists and rationalists of various bents observe that 
individuals form groups and institutions to pursue common interests.7 From this 
perspective, cooperation is limited only by the bounds of rationality and the bounda-
ries of groups and institutions can expand, potentially, without limit. Traditional 
structuralists, on the other hand, argue that structure limits cooperation and that 
conflict is central to institutional construction. They argue that real cleavages divide 
societies and create boundaries across which cooperation and voluntary institutions 
do not extend. For Marxists, boundaries that parallel class divisions are real, while 
those that separate organizations on either side of a social divide are transitory.8 
Structural realists in international relations recognize the explanatory power of states 
and the borders between them, but not of institutions that cross state boundaries or 
exist wholly within them.9
The new institutionalisms arose to explain cooperation in circumstances where 
there is strategic interaction, but cooperation is problematic.
 These two perspectives view social organization different-
ly, one as the reflection of interest and the other as the reflection of power. There is 
either harmony or conflict but little room for strategic interaction in organizing 
societies. 
10
                                                                                             
states. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). 
 Even while they 
recognize the complexities imposed by strategic interaction, however, new institutio-
nalists neglect boundaries, causing them to limit their understanding of the forms of 
6 Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” 
American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985): 481-510. 
7 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963); Robert Keohane, After 
Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
8 Ira Katznelson, “Working-Class Formation: Constructing Cases and Comparisons,” in Working-Class 
Formation, eds. Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 
3-41. 
9 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
1979). 
10 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 16. 
Grenzen und Grenzgänge(r) 122 
cooperation. The central problem for the new institutionalisms was how to explain 
cooperation among actors with common interests but different preferences. For 
rational choice institutionalists, conflict is a dysfunctional consequence of informa-
tion asymmetries, transaction costs, and coordination problems that institutions 
permit actors to overcome. It is assumed that a universal definition of rationality or 
utility bridges these conflicts, potentially extending boundaries of institutions out 
infinitely. Clever institutional designers, it is implied, can always find the common 
ground and manage conflicts. 
Historical institutionalists bring structure and conflict back into the spotlight in 
institutional construction, but they offer a truncated set of options for the institution-
al management of conflict. They recognize that institutional construction is embed-
ded in social structures that generate ideas and interests as well as constraints on 
resources and power. However, they confine the influence of structure and conflict to 
the construction of an institution’s authority relations. Structure, conflict, and power 
ultimately determine whose preferences are favored by authoritative rules, but they 
ignore the possibility that actors may decide to limit institutional jurisdiction, leaving 
some actors or actions beyond the reach of its authority relations. They may create 
parallel sets of authoritative rules and then seek to regulate their interactions. This is 
not quite cooperation, nor is it conflict, but rather an “agreement to disagree” or 
“peaceful coexistence.”11
Recognition that institutional construction is socially embedded points to the 
dual role that boundaries play “inside” and “outside” institutions and the “critical” 
nature of the junctures in which they are often created. They designate who may, or 
must, conform to rules defining authority “within” an institution. But they also 
demarcate the extent of those rules and how one institution, and its members, 
interact with other institutions. Defining such relations is critical not only to the 
institution’s own survival but also to the survival of other institutions and, perhaps, 
the survival of society.
 The institutional nature of such arrangements becomes 
apparent, however, only when one focuses on boundaries. 
12
                                                                
11 Günther Roth, The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany (New York: Arno Press, 1979) describes the 
“negative integration” of Social Democrats in Wilhelmine Germany. This issue is also central to 
literature on “consociationalism.” See for example Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977) and Kurt Richard Luther, “A Framework for the 
Comparative Analysis of Political Parties and Party Systems in Consociational Democracy,” in Party 
Elites in Divided Societies, eds. Kurt Richard Luther and Kris Deschouwer (London: Routledge, 1999). 
 This interdependence points to the fact that the boundaries 
of important institutions are likely to crystallize at the same time and as part of a 
larger process. Actors reach “settlements” that create full-fledged cooperation in 
some institutions even as they embed conflicting values in other institutions that 
exist parallel to one another. In establishing one area of authority and jurisdiction 
12 This has been the focus of the population ecology school in organizational theory. See Michael T. 
Hannan and John Freeman, “The Ecology of Organizational Founding: American Labor Unions, 1836-
1985,” The American Journal of Sociology 92 (1987): 910-943. 
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where certain actors have specified powers and roles, boundaries also create the 
negative of the institution in establishing realms where such authority, jurisdiction, 
powers and roles do not apply.13
3. BOUNDARIES, SOCIAL ORDER, AND INSTITUTIONAL SURVIVAL 
 Subsequently, institutional boundaries regulate the 
limits of institutional authority and the conduct of institutional interactions. 
The dual role of boundaries points to a source of legitimacy and support for in-
stitutions that institutionalists have neglected. For rational choice and historical 
institutionalists, institutions thrive when they reproduce and extend the interests 
they were constructed to promote directly.14 From this perspective, it is the interests 
of actors organized within the institution or the interests of groups or other institu-
tions that deal directly with it that support its survival. For economic institutionalists, 
actors will seek to design institutional boundaries so as to economize on transactions 
costs. They do not investigate how the social environment or “background condi-
tions” form and implicate the drawing of boundaries.15
Institutional boundaries do a number of things: they protect the institution; they 
provide institutional continuity; they define who belongs to the institution; they 
establish rights of institutions, placing them in particular positions vis-à-vis each 
other within a society; and they constrain actors’ behavior across and within institu-
tions. As such, it is the boundaries of institutions that make social order possible.
 Historical institutionalists tell 
us how the institutions come into being and how their boundaries may differ, but tell 
us little about how these boundaries reinforce or undermine the existing social order. 
Institutions contribute to the reproduction of societal values and social stability 
generally. Because they transmit values from the level of society to the level of 
individual actors, institutions are important to the reproduction of the values around 
which societies are organized. But the embeddedness of institutions in a society and 
the dual role of their boundaries point to a far broader base of support. 
16 
Boundaries are established to shield institutions from external pressures and influ-
ences as much as to create internal authority relations. They help ensure institutional 
survival because they provide a measure of security and a legal basis on which to 
challenge incursions and violations.17 Sovereignty functions in this manner at the 
international level, helping to ensure the survival of weak states.18
                                                                
13 One might think of the “pillar” structure of the European Union from the Maastricht Treaty to the 
Lisbon Treaty as a particularly transparent example. 
 In the United 
States, the boundaries of non-profit status allow 501(c)(3) organizations to guard 
14 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political 
Science Review 94 (2000): 251-268. 
15 W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations, 2nd edn. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001), 103. 
16 K. J. Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 116-118. 
17 Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns, 116-117. 
18 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns. 
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against their take-over by potentially more powerful political interests, serving 
thereby to enable institutional survival as well as broader social goals of public 
interest. Boundaries also help to guarantee institutional continuity, by designating 
the institution rather than actors within it as the carriers of autonomy. Political 
parties continue to exist despite changes in leadership and states survive when 
governments change or are not recognized.19
Institutional boundaries encourage social order by determining whether and 
how institutions “fit” into the “societies” of which they are part. In short, boundaries 
define how settlements regulating conflicts and cooperation within an institution 
conform to broader patterns of conflict and cooperation that define “societies.”
 
20 
They organize the myriad institutions within a social space. They place an institution 
and its rules in superordinate, subordinate, and competitive relationships with other 
institutions and groups and they transmit these relations to the level of individuals. 
In doing so, they establish particular roles and rights both within, and between, 
institutions and societies.21 For example, a basic institution of international society is 
diplomatic immunity, which designates the person, property, residence and embassy 
of a foreign ambassador as falling not within the jurisdiction of the host country, but 
rather the home country. To belong to international society, sovereigns must accept 
that within their territory there are bounded areas and actors outside of their authori-
ty and control. The boundaries of this institution are clearly specified and are 
designed to preserve the overarching institution of sovereign equality.22
Rules defining boundaries bring individuals in line with the decision-making 
mechanisms that make collective action possible within the institution.
 When such 
institutional boundaries are violated, as when the revolutionary Iranian government 
held US and Canadian diplomats hostage in the 1979-1980 hostage crisis, the violator 
is viewed as not belonging to international society and is often punished. 
23
                                                                
19 Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns, 117. 
 At the same 
20 March and Olsen distinguish between two different logics at work in much of international relations 
theorizing, a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness. Most structuralists and pluralists 
and rationalists adhere to the logic of consequences – that the ends produced explain the means 
pursued, or in our case, the boundaries built. However, we argue that boundaries are defined not only 
according to the consequences, but they also reflect and create logics of appropriateness. James G. 
March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International 
Organization 52 (1998): 943-69. 
21 March and Olsen, “Institutional Dynamics.” 
22 The institutions of diplomacy were spelled out in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
which entered into force in 1964, but which codified five centuries of practice. The International Court 
of Justice ruled in 1980 that the Iranian government had violated not only a contract in the form of the 
Vienna Convention, but also the broader obligations of a state in international society. See Ian 
Brownlie, Principles of International Law 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 342. On 
diplomacy as one of the fundamental institutions giving rise to an international society of states, see 
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, ch. 3. 
23 Ira Katznelson, “Periodization and Preferences: Reflections on Purposive Action in Comparative 
Historical Social Science,” in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, eds. James Mahoney 
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time, they force individual behavior to conform to rules governing relationships 
between one institution and others. They provide authoritative rules about behavior 
that tell individuals how to navigate complex social environments where groups and 
institutions pursue different preferences.24 The government of Iran was cast out by 
international society for failing to prevent and then approving the actions of militant 
students, not government officials, which were contrary to international society’s 
values of maintaining inter-state interaction and the inviolability of sovereigns. Iran 
was punished for not forcing its individual citizens to conform to the rules governing 
relations among states within international society. While Iran continues to pursue 
values at odds with many other states, it no longer pursues behaviors that directly 
challenge the core values of an international society of sovereign states.25
Boundaries in the German Union Federation’s (DGB) have evolved to place simi-
lar constraints on the behavior of German unionists. Article 8 of the DGB’s postwar 
statute mandated “neutrality,” obligating the federation and its unions to operate 
independently of the influence from government, parties, religious communities, 
public administrations and employers, although the exact meaning of union “inde-
pendence”—initially—remained ambiguous.
 
26 In the first years of the Federal 
Republic the conservative government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer resisted 
successfully DGB attempts to influence directly government policy. Social Democrat-
ic unionists responded by purging the DGB leadership and mobilizing the union 
movement to support the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the 1953 federal elec-
tions.27 In turn, Catholic and Christian unionists threatened to desert the DGB and 
found a rival Christian federation. Unwilling to reactivate the ideological schisms of 
Weimar era unions, Social Democratic unionists backed down and the DGB placed 
clear boundaries on the use of union resources for political campaigns and the 
partisan activities of peak-level DGB and union officials.28
                                                                                             
and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 295; Charles Taylor, “Modernity and 
Identity,” in Schools of Thought, eds. Joan W. Scott and Debra Keates (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), 139-53. 
 DGB and union members 
pursue interests opposed to other social groups, but they do so within boundaries. 
24 Frederik Barth, “Introduction,” in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, ed. Frederik Barth (Oslo: 
Universitaetsforlaget, 1969), 15-17; Katznelson, ”Periodization and Preferences,” 295. 
25 Brownlie, Principles of International Law, 342. 
26 Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht: Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland (Munich: Mercator 
Verlag, 1960) vol.2, 77. 
27 Pirker, Die blinde Macht, v.2, 23ff; Kurt Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei (Berlin and Bonn: J.H.W. 
Dietz Nachfolger GmbH, 1982), 250-251. 
28 A partisan Proporz (“proportionality”) distributes positions in the DGB executive among Social 
Democrats and Christian unionists. Lower level DGB and union officials hold Bundestag mandates for 
various parties, but strong norms prevent members of the DGB Executive and union presidents from 
representing parties in parliament or government. Both SPD- and CDU/CSU-led governments consult 
union leaders in selecting individuals for cabinet positions, especially the Minster for Labor and Social 
Policy, but unionists relinquish union functions while holding such portfolios. See Anton Pelinka, 
Gewerkschaften im Parteienstaat (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980), 95-6, 99, 109-10, 114. 
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Institutional boundaries in domestic and international political arenas force individ-
ual behavior to conform to higher-level values embedded in social structure. The 
boundaries of institutions, therefore, reflect conflicts and compromises not only 
between the members of an institution, but also between the protagonists of different 
values in society. 
Institutions win legitimacy and broader support by reinforcing social values.29 By 
organizing social space and transmitting the hierarchy of societal values through to 
the level of individuals, institutional boundaries act as a critical part of the “settle-
ments” that prevent societies from disintegrating. This means those interested in 
supporting and enforcing the boundaries of a particular institution extends beyond 
actors who participate in or interact with it directly to a broader set of societal actors. 
To the extent that an institution contributes to the reproduction of social values, the 
maintenance and enforcement of its rules, particularly its boundaries, become a 
matter of social stability. They matter not only to members of the institution and 
those who interact with it directly, but also to society more generally.30 This 
represents the growth of “legitimacy” and may be the result of different processes.31 
Rationalists stress that institutions perform functions that make them indispensable 
to the reproduction of values that keep society together.32 Sociological perspectives 
argue that some institutions have symbolic or cognitive value that makes their 
survival essential to the legitimacy and survival of other institutions in society.33
A contemporary example arises from the sometimes furious debate over the se-
paration between church and state in the United States. This boundary is often cast as 
a foundational value of U.S. society, preventing both the establishment of a hierarchy 
of religions or ideologies within the United States and the state-sanctioned subordi-
nation of minority religious views to majority ones. Churches and religions as 
institutions are deeply socially embedded in this particular fashion in the United 
States and their limited boundaries are understood within a broader frame of 
ordering and preserving fundamental societal values. 
 
Regardless of its source, this legitimacy provides a reason for even those actors who 
are not directly affected by its actions to enforce its rules. 
Similarly, the evolution of DGB “neutrality,” described above, is intimately 
linked to the unionists’ desire to support parliamentary democracy in the fledgling 
                                                                
29 Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986). 
30 Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, “Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political 
Economies,” in Beyond Continuity, eds. Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
31 Arthur Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 163. 
32 See for example, James Fearon and David Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” American 
Political Science Review 90 (1996): 715-735. 
33 Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, “Introduction,” in The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis, eds. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1991); and W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations, 77. 
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Federal Republic. Contrary to many unionist hopes, the Adenauer government 
asserted a doctrine of “parliamentary sovereignty,” delegitimizing extra-
parliamentary pressure (e.g. strikes) for political ends and limiting the ability of 
unionists to influence policy.34 Unionists accepted “parliamentary sovereignty”—and 
a consequent division of labor that left parties as the representatives of employees’ 
interests in policy arenas and unions as the employees’ representatives in labor 
markets—as the price of stabilizing institutions of West German democracy against 
subversion. German unions became a “pillar” (Ordnungsfaktor) of the democratic 
order rather than a “principled opposition” (Gegenmacht), supporting, and supported 
by, other groups carrying democracy in West German society.35
4. INSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES, VARIANCE, AND BEHAVIOR 
 Thus, the examples of 
separation of church and state in the US and the acceptance of “parliamentary 
sovereignty” in the FRG demonstrate how institutions acquire legitimacy and broad 
support in the societies of which they are part because boundaries project “settle-
ments” about societal values over individuals’ behavior. 
The new institutionalisms’ neglect of boundaries also blinds them to important 
effects of institutions on actor behavior. A central focus of historical institutionalists, 
in particular, has been explaining how actors construct similar institutions—unions, 
for example—differently in different places.36 Likewise, constructivists have sought 
to explain how variations on the institution of the nation-state affect the nature of 
inter-state interaction.37
These explanations of institutional variance neatly extend to institutional boun-
daries. Although all institutional boundaries organize social settlements over indi-
vidual behavior, similar institutions can have different rules that govern their 
boundaries. Institutions that exist in the same society as well as those that perform 
 Differing institutional structures then become an explanation 
for variance in actor behavior. The historical institutionalist and constructivist 
argument about the origins of behavioral variance can be applied to institutional 
boundaries. Doing so provides insights into behaviors that an exclusive focus on 
authority relations within institutions might overlook. 
                                                                
34 This use of the term “parliamentary sovereignty” should not be confused with the use of the term in 
the context of British politics where it indicates that parliament acts without formal constraint by a 
written constitution or the acts of previous parliaments. 
35 Eberhard Schmidt, Ordnungsfaktor oder Gegenmacht: Die politische Rolle der Gewerkschaften (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1971). 
36 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in 
Structuring Politics, eds. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge U.K. and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1-32. 
37 John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations,” International Organization 47 (1993); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: 
Norms and Identity in World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Alexander 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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similar roles in different societies may have different boundaries. For example, the 
Austrian Trade Union Federation’s (ÖGB) statute contains a neutrality clause almost 
identical to the DGB’s, but institutional boundaries permitted complete interpenetra-
tion of party and union organizations and direct integration of unions into policy 
making.38 Such diversity is the consequence of the different value preferences that 
distinguish social “settlements” across societies and “path dependence.”39
Existing analyses provide an explanation for why institutional boundaries vary, 
but—so far—they have not examined how they vary. We suggest that, most simply, 
boundaries vary in their permeability, whether they permit outside actors to exercise 
influence within an institution and whether they permit actors within the institution 
to wield influence in other arenas. Does society condone, through particular boun-
dary regulations, the influence of some actors or institutions on the decision making 
of other institutions or not? How are the authority relations inside the institution 
related to the hierarchies that govern other institutions and society itself? Do boun-
dary regulations create privileged channels of influence for some types of actors or 
do they seek to limit them, forcing contests to influence institutional decision making 
into more transparent or competitive arenas? As a concrete example, one might 
consider the different means of integrating markets across national boundaries: 
managed trade, harmonization and mutual recognition.
 Path 
dependent arguments suggest that events in one time influence future events. Social 
structure and the distribution of power vary across time and place, pushing individ-
ual societies toward particular conflicts, and resolutions of them, and different 
institutional structures. For example, different distributions of power among social 
groups might lead to the creation of governance institutions based on representative 
democracy in one place or authoritarianism in another. Or, to extend the comparison 
above, differences in the Allied administration of Austrian and German occupation, 
permitted unions in the former—but not the latter—to exploit their strength in the 
immediate postwar era to institutionalize their influence in economic policy making. 
Once in place, however, institutions tend to reinforce certain interests and outcomes, 
cementing the relationships that led to their structure in the first instance. Thus, 
institutions project the impact of particular conflicts, distributions of power, and 
social choices across time. This same process produces variance in institutional 
boundaries. Because they come into being under different circumstances, the boun-
daries of institutions look very different from one another. 
40
                                                                
38 Pelinka, Gewerkschaften im Parteienstaat, 104; Fritz Klenner, Das Unbehagen in der Demokratie (Vienna: 
Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1956), 54ff. 
 These questions are not 
new, but the concerns of an “old” institutionalism of Montesquieu and Madison. This 
“old” institutionalism recognized explicitly that institutional boundaries are mechan-
39 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns;” James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” 
Theory and Society 29 (2000): 526-7. 
40 Miles Kahler, “Trade and Domestic Differences,” in National Diversity and Global Capitalism, ed. S. 
Berger and R. Dore (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 300. 
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isms that enforce societies’ preferences over individual behavior, elevating some 
values while subordinating others. While the “old” institutionalism focused on the 
boundaries of formal governmental institutions, however, we see the problem of 
boundaries extending wherever there are institutions. Classically, four mechanisms 
have permitted actors to influence decision making across institutional boundaries: 
1) formal rules that specify such influence (often backed up by state power); 2) 
control over resources critical to an institution; 3) the personal union of decision-
making roles in different institutions; and 4) ideological affinity. Boundaries that 
proscribe such mechanisms are relatively impermeable, such as anti-trust laws that 
prohibit collusion among firms. Those that condone them are more permeable, such 
as the overlapping jurisdictions in federal systems. 
The relative permeability of institutional boundaries touches on many types of 
behavioral outcomes. Boundary regulations have perhaps their greatest impact on 
the coordination of decision making between institutions and organizations. Between 
functionally differentiated institutions, permeable boundaries may permit coordina-
tion as between the “pillarized” institutions of plural societies. Impermeable or solid 
boundaries between interest groups and parties, on the other hand, may enforce a 
division of representational labor between them, such as between parties and unions 
in postwar West Germany. Between undifferentiated organizations, permeable 
boundaries may invite collusion while solid boundaries enforce competition. In the 
structural realist conception of states as unitary actors, bounded by sovereignty, these 
actors are functionally the same as their core purpose is vying for survival in an 
anarchic system.41
We have focused on the stabilizing and reproductive elements of institutional 
boundaries here, though we recognize that variance in institutional boundaries also 
facilitates institutional change and can undermine stability. Permeability in particular 
opens the possibility for boundary shifts that may significantly alter the institution 
itself and its internal relations, but also its relations with external institutions.
 Boundary regulations may also shape flows of information. The 
price mechanism of the mythical, perfectly competitive market relies on borders 
between firms that guarantee all equal access to information. Conversely, the success 
of collusion often depends on the maintenance of opacity around decision making. 
These are areas of behavior shaped as much by the limitations placed on authorita-
tive rules as by the rules themselves. 
42
                                                                
41 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, ch. 4. 
 These 
boundary changes in turn can trigger societal change. Attention to how a boundary 
gets drawn or the nature and outcome of boundary disputes will bring more atten-
tion to how such changes can feed back into society to alter fundamental institutions 
and values as well as the overall organization of society. Small changes in institution-
42 For an empirical example of permeability in the boundary of sovereignty leading to broader 
institutional change, see Anne L. Clunan, “Redefining Sovereignty: Humanitarianism's Challenge to 
Sovereign Immunity,” in Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights: Actors and Issues in Contemporary 
Human Rights Politics, ed. Noha Shawki and Michaelene Cox (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 7-26. 
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al boundaries can ultimately have large societal effects, as small changes in the 
drawing of jurisdictions can have reverberations for overall societal order. This is an 
issue we raise here primarily with an eye to further research, as our main focus has 
been on how boundaries matter and how they vary. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have sought to highlight how the nature of, and change in, the boundaries of 
discrete institutions has important consequences for broader social organization and 
order. Institutional boundaries deserve attention because they are what structure – in 
very different ways – the amount and ease of access between institutional domains. 
In defining that access, they can serve to reproduce or alter institutions. 
The nature of boundaries determines whether, and which, actors are able, or un-
able, to operate legitimately within, and across, institutional jurisdictions. Boundaries 
transmit social and institutional rules internally, as in the interactions between unions 
and political parties and between sovereign governments and their citizens, but they 
also transmit social rules between institutions, as in the preservation of sovereign 
immunity.43
We have also suggested that the creation of boundaries, or their change, can re-
verberate throughout other institutions in society, shaping their relations and the 
overall degree of institutionalization of the values on which a society is founded. 
Boundaries transmit social values and roles to institutional and societal actors and 
individuals. For these reasons, we think that more attention needs to be paid to the 
boundaries of institutions. Without understanding how these borders come into 
being and what the consequences of their creation and alteration are, we are likely to 
miss how the nature of a boundary or its change can ripple through society, poten-
tially producing major institutional as well as societal change. 
 In these ways, boundaries can protect institutions and contribute to 
institutional survival and continuity. They also organize and stabilize social orders, 
fostering collective action in some realms and regulating conflict in others. 
An important focus of future research is the way in which boundaries can vary 
and the consequences of that variance. We suggest that the variance in the permeabil-
ity of boundaries is particularly worthy of further research for three reasons. First, 
the permeability of an institution’s boundaries is likely to have significant impact not 
only on relations within, and between, institutions, but also on the overall pattern of 
power and authority within society. This is because permeability determines which 
actors have power and influence within, and across, institutions. Second, the per-
meability of boundaries determines the likelihood of political struggles over those 
boundaries and therefore the likelihood of institutional change. Third, as a conse-
quence, permeable boundaries are more likely to be associated with fundamental 
transformation of the values underpinning society. We suggest that the tools of 
                                                                
43 Clunan, “Redefining Sovereignty.” 
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historical institutional and constructivist analysis are particularly appropriate for 
understanding when, and how, boundaries come into being, how they facilitate 
collective action among like, and unlike, actors; and, more broadly, for understanding 
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